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This paper develops a model of costly information acquisition by agents who are
connected through a network. For a exogenously given network, each agent decides
rst on information acquisition from his neighbors and then, after processing the
information acquired, takes an action. Each agent is concerned about the extent to
which other agents align their actions with the underlying state. A new equilibrium
notion, which is in the spirit of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, is proposed to ana-
lyze information acquisition decisions within networked groups. This equilibrium
notion allows each agent to compute, when deciding about information acquisi-
tion, the extent to which changes in his information acquisition decision will aect
his own perception of future expected payos. Agents anticipate and incorporate
such changes in their information acquisition decisions. Both the ecient and the
equilibrium information acquisition pro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between them is related to the density of the network.
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11 Introduction
In many economic and social settings, agents acquire information from others in order
to improve their knowledge of the underlying fundamentals. For example, a researcher
acquires information from colleagues in order to improve his knowledge of a certain sci-
entic problem and of the possible alternatives to address it. Also, it is common that
investors in a new sector acquire information from other investors to obtain more accu-
rate predictions of the economic variables aecting the protability of the sector. Most
of these information acquisition activities often take place through networks.
Despite the widespread use of information acquisition within networked groups, little is
known about this phenomenon. How do agents interact with respect to their information
acquisition decisions when they are connected through a network? How is the compat-
ibility between ecient and equilibrium information acquisition related to the network
architecture? To address these questions, this paper provides a game theoretical frame-
work that treats the transmission of information as a result of a Bayesian belief revision
process.
In this model, the architecture of the network is exogenously given and common knowl-
edge, and agents are engaged in a two-stage game. In the rst stage, each agent chooses
at a cost the amount of information that he acquires from his neighbors. In the second
stage, each agent chooses a payo-relevant action. Agents are able to receive information
only from their direct neighbors, so that I do not consider the network eect which forms
an essential part of most of the analyses of communication networks.
This model is built on the assumption that, when the agents choose the amount of
information that they acquire, they correctly anticipate and compute the extent to which
the newly acquired information will change their perceptions of their own future expected
payos. This assumption constitutes the crucial sequential rationality requirement of the
equilibrium concept proposed in this paper, information acquisition equilibrium (IAE).
The IAE concept requires that each agent be sequentially rational in both stages of the
underlying game and that posterior beliefs be consistent, according to Bayes' rule, with
the strategies over messages chosen in the rst stage. Thus, IAE requirements seem
analogous to those of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In fact, IAE departs from perfect
Bayesian equilibrium only in the way in which the agents compute their expected payos
in the rst stage. In an IAE, an agent's expected payo in the rst stage is specied
by discounting his expected payos at the various information sets in the second stage
according to the combination of strategies over messages chosen by the agents. Given this
specication, when an agent changes his information acquisition choice at the rst stage,
he is able to compute the extent to which his own perception of his payo in the second
2stage will change.
The motivation for this key sequential rationality requirement of IAE has a behavioral
nature and clearly contrasts that of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the equilibrium concept
usually proposed to analyze information revelation decisions. In signaling1 and cheap
talk2 models, an agent who decides about information revelation cares about the action
that he induces the receiver to take rather than about any changes on his own posterior
beliefs.3 However, when an agent decides about acquiring new information, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that he anticipates the self-induced changes on his posterior beliefs and
the extent to which such changes will aect his perception of own future payos. Then, it
seems appropriate to consider that, at the date when the agent decides about information
acquisition, he cares about both the induced optimal actions and the anticipated percep-
tion of his own future payos. The nature of the problem of information acquisition seems
dierent from that of information revelation. This paper proposes an equilibrium concept
suitable to incorporate into the agents' rationality the fact that they anticipate the role
of the acquired information in shaping their own posterior beliefs and, accordingly, their
own perceptions of future expected payos. For the two-agent version of the underlying
game, we can simplify an agent's expected payo in the rst stage as it is specied in
an IAE so as to obtain the expected payo used in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This
shows that both concepts of equilibrium coincide for the two-agent case. However, they
turn out to be dierent equilibrium concepts for the case with more than two agents.
Regarding preferences, I adopt a particular choice which seems reasonable to study
information acquisition within groups. In this model, a sender cannot decide about the
amount of information that he discloses to his neighbors. Therefore, strategic interactions
over actions are ruled out. Each agent's payo depends on the appropriateness of his own
action to the underlying state. In addition, an agent's payo decreases with the distance
between the others' actions and the state|this is the way in which positive \informational
spillovers" are formalized. Also, to render the analysis tractable, I assume that payos
are quadratic.
The main motivation for the assumed preferences comes from organizations or groups
where their members face similar problems which they must solve independently, and
where each of them wishes to solve his problem but also values that the other agents solve
theirs too. Clearly, in this framework no agent has incentives to refuse to transmit his
1See, e.g., Spence [20], Rothschild and Stiglitz [19], and Wilson [23].
2The seminal work on cheap talk is due to Crawford and Sobel [11].
3In fact, the study of posterior beliefs and perceptions of the agent who decides about information
transmission is not the purpose of these sender-receiver models since they assume that the receiver is
completely informed about the underlying state.
3information to others so that the analysis of information revelation decisions is irrelevant.
Then, we can aptly restrict attention to information acquisition decisions. Examples
of such groups or organizations are those of a research department, where its members
pursuit independently similar innovations, or a group of investors in a new sector, where
the protability of the sector increases as more investors choose investment strategies
appropriate to the underlying state.
To study the eciency properties of information acquisition through a network, I
consider that the planner seeks to maximize the sum of the ex ante payos of the agents.
Proposition 1 provides the following necessary and sucient condition for an information
acquisition prole to be ecient: it is ecient to acquire full information from a given
neighbor if and only if the cost of information acquisition does not exceed the variance
of the neighbor's type. Otherwise, it is ecient to acquire no information at all from
that neighbor. Not surprisingly, this result gives us an eciency criterion in terms of the
marginal cost and the marginal benet derived from information acquisition.
The second result of this paper characterizes an agent's best response information
acquisition strategy with respect to a given neighbor. Proposition 2 shows that the
incentives of an agent to acquire information from a neighbor increase with the amount
of information that the rest of neighbors of that neighbor acquire from him.
Both the sequential rationality requirement at the rst stage of the underlying game
imposed by the IAE notion and the presence of positive informational spillovers are crucial
to obtain the result that agents wish to coordinate their information acquisition decisions.
The following example illustrates the forces behind this result. Consider three agents such
that agent 1 is linked to agent 2 and agent 2 is linked to agent 3. We are then encouraged
to ask what forces cause agent 1's decision about information acquisition from agent 2 to
depend on agent 3's choice about information acquisition from agent 2. Agent 1 knows
the strategy over messages that agent 2 adopts with respect to agent 3 (which is indeed
chosen by agent 3). However, so long as he does not acquire full information from agent
2, he is still uncertain about agent 2's type. As a consequence, he is also uncertain about
the particular message that agent 2 sends to agent 3. In other words, the information that
agent 1 acquires from agent 2 improves his knowledge about 2's private information but
also about the extent to which agent 3 acquires information from agent 2. Therefore, this
information also changes his perception of the extent to which agent 3 is able to solve his
problem. Then, by changing his information acquisition decision with respect to agent 2,
agent 3 changes the relation between agent 1's information acquisition choice with respect
to agent 2 and agent 1's own (anticipated) perception of agent 3's most preferred action.
This aects agent 1's information acquisition choice with respect to agent 2 given that (i)
4information acquisition is costly, (ii) agent 1 cares about agent 3's action, and (iii) agent
1 is risk averse with respect to agent 3's action.
Regarding its welfare implications, this paper provides conditions in terms of a pre-
cise measure of the network density|the minimum degree of the network|under which
ecient information acquisition can be either reached in an IAE or not. These results,
provided by Corollaries 1 and 2, suggest that it is more likely that the IAE be ecient
when the least connected agent is highly connected relative to the size of the entire group.
To the best of my knowledge this paper is the rst to conduct an analysis of strategic
information acquisition decisions and their welfare implications for networked groups. For
networks that allow for communication among connected agents, Jackson and Wolinsky
[15], and Bala and Goyal [4] pioneered the study of the compatibility between ecient and
equilibrium networks.4 For tractability reasons, most of this literature do not consider the
information transmission problem in terms of a Bayesian belief revision process. Instead,
certain given relations are assumed between an agent's payo and the number of agents
whose information he can access. By doing so, the eects of information on payos are
exogenously modeled and the role of information in shaping beliefs is ignored.
Recently, some papers have analyzed communication networks using Bayesian belief
revision processes to model information transmission. Calv o-Armengol and de Mart  [8]
consider a framework where agents communicate through a given network as a result
of a Bayesian belief revision process that takes place in successive rounds. The main
dierences between their approach and that followed in this paper are: (i) they do not
consider endogenous information transmission decisions, and (ii) the class of preferences
that they assume include a second-guessing coordination motive. Hagenbach and Koessler
[13] consider a model where each agent decides whether or not to reveal his private
information to the others before choosing his own action. The choices on information
revelation determine endogenously a communication network. The main dierence with
this paper is in the fact that they study information revelation decisions. Consequently,
they use perfect Bayesian equilibrium as solution concept. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
is arguably an appropriate equilibrium concept for that problem. As a result, they do not
obtain strategic interactions over information transmission decisions at equilibrium. This
marks a sharp contrast with the results of this paper.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The model and the notions of equilibrium
and eciency are introduced in Section 2. Section 3 characterizes both the set of ecient
and the set of equilibrium information acquisition proles, and presents the results that
4The line of research on communication networks has been pursued further in dierent contexts,
among others, by Suk-Young Chwe [21], Calv o-Armengol [7], Bloch and Dutta [5], Calv o-Armengol and
de Mart  [8], and Calv o-Armengol and Jackson [9].
5relate the compatibility between equilibrium and eciency to the network density. In
Section 4, I discuss the robustness of the model. Formal justications are provided by
considering two perturbations of the model: one where types are drawn according to a
Normal distribution and each agent receives a signal consisting of the true type plus some
noise; the other with non-linear information acquisition costs. Section 5 concludes with




There is a nite set of agents N := f1;:::;ng, with n  2. The shorthand notation5
ij denotes the subset of N, of size two, containing agents i and j, which is referred to
as the link ij. A communication network g is a collection of links where ij 2 g means
that i and j are directly linked and able to acquire information from each other under
network g. Let G denote the set of all possible networks on N. For a network g 2 G, the
set of agent i's neighbors is Ni(g) := fj 2 N : ij 2 gg and the number of his neighbors
is ni(g) := jNi(g)j. Finally, let (g) := mini2N ni(g) and (g) := maxi2N ni(g) denote,
respectively, the minimum and the maximum degree of network g. Both (g) and (g)
can be understood as measures of the extent to which agents are connected in network g.
The architecture of the network itself is exogenously given and common knowledge.
2.2 Information Structure, Actions, and Payos
Given a network g 2 G, agents are engaged in a game that is played in two consecutive
stages numbered 1 and 2. In stage 1, each agent i 2 N decides the amount of information
that he acquires from each agent in his neighborhood Ni(g). In stage 2, each agent chooses
an action using the information that he has acquired from his neighbors in stage 1.
The initial private information of each agent i 2 N is described by his type ti, an
element of Ti := [0;1]. For each variable, set, or function, denote its prole over all agents
by the corresponding bold letter and its prole over all agents except that of agent i with
the corresponding letter with subscript  i.6 A state of the world is denoted t := (ti)i2N
5The network notation presented here was developed by Jackson and Wolinsky [15].
6This notation is standard. Specically, for each set Yi with generic element yi 2 Yi, for some agent
i 2 N, write Y to denote the Cartesian product i2NYi, and, accordingly, write y := (yi)i2N 2 Y
and y i := (y1;:::;yi 1;yi+1;:::;yn) 2 Y i. Likewise, for each family of functions hi : Y ! Z, write
h(y) := (hi(yi))i2N and h i(y i) := (hj(yj))j6=i.
6and the state space is7 T := i2NTi = [0;1]n.8 Thus, agent i's type is the respective
coordinate ti of the actual state t. All aspects of this game, except t, are common
knowledge. Clearly, this information structure exhibits complementarities in the sense
that two distinct agents improve their knowledge about the underlying state by sharing
their pieces of private information. In particular, the true state is always obtained by
combining the pieces of private information of all the agents.9
Although the proposed information structure relates generally to situations with in-
formational complementarities, the main motivation of this model comes from situations
where agents face independently a common (or similar) decision problem with several
independent \aspects" so that solving the problem requires to solve the various aspects.
Each agent is an \expert" in one aspect so that the knowledge about how to solve the
problem is improved by information sharing.
In stage 2, each agent chooses a payo-relevant action. An action for agent i is an
n-coordinate vector ai 2 Ai := [0;1]n. Thus, the action space available to each agent
i 2 N coincides with the state space, Ai := T = [0;1]n. The idea here is to think of
an action as a collection of all the independent steps that an agent must take in order
to solve his decision problem (one step for each aspect of the problem). Let aik 2 [0;1]
denote the k-th coordinate of the action vector ai taken by agent i, i.e., ai := (aik)k2N.
Intuitively, aik summarizes the action taken by agent i with respect to the k-th aspect of
the decision problem.
Under the chosen preferences, strategic interactions over actions are ruled out. Each
agent wishes, on the one hand, to match his own action with the true state and, on the
other hand, is concerned about the extent to which the other agents align their actions
with the true state. I call this second motive the team concern and interpret it as a positive
\informational spillover" or externality aecting the organization/group. I am assuming
that the organization receives higher benets, either monetary or in terms of prestige, as
more of its members perform \well" in their independent tasks. Thus, contingent on the
performance of the entire organization, each member is rewarded in terms of reputation
or monetary payments. For example, consider a set of investors choosing their investment
strategies in a new sector, where the protability of the sector increases with the number
of investors that choose a \good" investment strategy. Consequently, each investor cares
about the extent to which the rest of investors align their actions with the true state.
7The proposed state space is similar to those used in models on multidimensional cheap talk. See,
e.g., Chakraborty and Harbaugh [10], and Levy and Razin [17].
8For a set B and an integer l, write Bl to denote the l-fold Cartesian product of B.
9Jim enez-Mart nez [16] proposes an analogous information structure to study a two-agent information
sharing problem.
7Of course, a broad class of applications can be covered by this model when one thinks
of the team concern in terms of benets derived to each agent from the prestige of the
organization.
With regards to the team concern, let r 2 [0;1] be a scalar parameter that measures
the extent to which each agent cares about the alignment of the other agents' actions
with the true state. Let k  k denote the Euclidean norm. The payo to agent i is given
by the function Ui : A  T  [0;1] ! R dened by








The rst term in equation (1) above is the quadratic loss in the distance between agent
i's own action and the true state. The second term is the team concern, i.e, the payo
loss derived from the discrepancy between the other agents' actions and the true state.
Parameter r gives us the weight of such a team behavior motive. Notice that the payo
of each agent is strictly decreasing with respect to the (Euclidean) distance between the
action that he chooses and the true state. Thus, each agent has incentives to acquire
information since more information allows for actions better suited to the underlying
state. Of course, for each r 2 (0;1], the specied preferences represent common interests
for all agents. Finally, I am assuming that the team concern has the form of a positive
informational spillover in the sense that, for each i 2 N, Ui(a;t;r) strictly decreases with
kt   ajk, for each j 6= i.
Although the proposed payos are very specic, they can be viewed as a second-
order approximation of a more general class of convex preferences. The assumptions
imposed on preferences make the analysis tractable. More importantly, this class of
preferences allows us to work with all the relevant ingredients that describe an environment
without strategic interactions over actions and with external positive eects. The fact that
strategic interactions over actions are absent will enable us to focus on the analysis of how
the agents interact strategically only over their information acquisition decisions.
2.3 The Information Transmission Process
There is a set M := [0;1] of feasible messages available to each agent for information
transmission purposes. Thus, the message space coincides with the type space of each
agent, and a message m 2 M sent by agent i may be interpreted as a statement that his
type is ti = m.
At the beginning of stage 1, each agent i 2 N chooses the message that each of
his neighbors j 2 Ni(g) sends to him.10 All messages are sent simultaneously. Write
10Formally, an agent chooses the message strategy that each of his neighbors adopts with respect to
8mji 2 M to denote a generic message sent from agent j to agent i, mi := (mji)j6=i to
denote a combination of messages received by agent i, and m := (mi)i2N 2 Mn(n 1) to
denote a message prole.
In terms of strategies, each agent chooses the degree of informativeness of the message
strategy that each of his neighbors adopts with respect to him. As it will be specied
below, a scalar parameter xij 2 [0;1] is used to summarize the degree of informativeness
of agent j's message strategy with respect to agent i. Thus, for each j 2 Ni(g), agent
i must choose an information acquisition parameter xij and we interpret this choice as
agent i acquiring an amount of information xij from agent j.
After each agent has chosen the information acquisition parameter for each of his
neighbors, a state t is randomly drawn from T according to a continuous joint density q()
and each agent learns the corresponding type.11 Each type ti is drawn from Ti according
to a (common) probability distribution, with continuous marginal density f(), supported
on [0;1]. I assume that the agents' types are independent so that a state t is drawn from
T according to density q(t) :=
Q
i2N f(ti). Let us denote the mean and the variance of
each agent i's type, respectively, by  :=
R 1
0 f(ti)tidti and by 2 :=
R 1
0 f(ti)(ti   )2dti.
I can now be more specic about the information acquisition parameter and its in-
terpretation. For i 2 N and j 2 Ni(g), xij is the weight parameter of a linear com-
bination between a totally non-informative (pooling) and a totally informative (com-
pletely separating) message strategy. Formally, given the information acquisition param-
eter xij, agent j's type tj sends message mji 2 M to agent i according to the function
ji : M  Tj  [0;1] ! [0;1] dened as
ji(mjijtj;xij) := (1   xij)f(mji) + xijI(mjijtj); (2)
where I : M  Tj ! [0;1] is the indicator function dened, for each (mji;tj) 2 M  Tj,
i 6= j, by (i) I(mjijtj) = 1 if mji = tj, and (ii) I(mjijtj) = 0 if mji 6= tj.
For xij 2 [0;1], i;j 2 N, i 6= j, ji(;xij) species a message strategy for agent
j with respect to agent i, parameterized by xij. Therefore, ji(mjijtj;xij) is the density
associated to type tj sending message mji to agent i, given that agent i chooses information
acquisition parameter xij. Thus, xij can be interpreted as agent i choosing quality xij for
the message service through which he receives information from agent j about his type
(or simply as agent i acquiring amount xij of information from agent j).
Since the message space coincides with the type space of each agent, density f can be
evaluated meaningfully at each message m 2 M. Therefore, expression (2) above species
him. In this sense, this choice may be interpreted as a decision about the quality of a message service.
11In the present context, it would be equivalent to assume that agents learn their private information
before they decide about information acquisition.
9an appropriate class of message strategies for information transmission purposes.
Each agent i 2 N incurs a cost c > 0 (in terms of time, eort, or money) for each
unit of information that he acquires from each of his neighbors. Thus, the cost function
is assumed to be linear. The described two-stage game typically has multiple equilibria.
Under the assumptions imposed on payos, the objective problem of an agent with respect
to information acquisition is not concave. These assumptions also imply that agents make
corner choices at equilibrium.
The class of message strategies allowed for is admittedly very specic. Three points
should be made in defense of this choice. The rst is that it captures quite conveniently,
and without loss of generality for our purposes, the extent to which an agent j transmits
his information to another agent i: (i) if xij = 0, then agent j reveals no information at all
(i.e., he pools), (ii) if xij = 1, then agent j fully reveals (i.e., he completely separates), and
(iii) if xij 2 (0;1), then agent j reveals partially (i.e., he semi-separates). Furthermore,
the relation between the degree of informativeness of agent j's message strategy with
respect to agent i and xij is continuous and strictly increasing on the interval [0;1].12
The second point is that, as it will be discussed in Subsection 4.1, the assumed message
strategies induce posterior beliefs whose (conditional) mean and variance behave in a way
totally analogous to those obtained by assuming that the information transmission process
is described by a Normal signal consisting of the true type plus some noise. This way
of modeling information transmission is standard in the recent literature on the social
value of information and on communication networks.13 Thus, an interesting class of
information transmission processes falls qualitatively within this model.
The third point is that the underlying game where the agents decide about informa-
tion acquisition has typically multiple equilibria. This makes problematic any analysis
of welfare implications. The proposed message strategies have a linear structure which,
together with the linear structure assumed for preferences and for the cost function, mit-
igates crucially this problem. This makes tractable the analysis of social eciency. This
paper aims at studying the compatibility between equilibrium and ecient information
acquisition in networks. The chosen message strategies, together with the assumptions
on preferences over actions and the linearity assumption on the cost function, allows us
to concentrate on this question.
Let xi := (xij)j6=i 2 Xi := [0;1]n 1 denote an information acquisition strategy for
12The fact that the amount of information transmitted by an agent j to his neighbor i is completely
described by parameter xij 2 [0;1] enables us to model the information possessed by each agent as a
perfectly divisible good. Thus, using the proposed class of message strategies, we avoid the complicated
problem that results when information is modeled as an indivisible good, as successfully studied by Allen
[1], [2].
13See, e.g., Angeletos and Pavan [3], and Calv o-Armengol and de Mart  [8].
10agent i and let X := i2NXi be the set of all information acquisition proles. For a given
network g 2 G, each agent i 2 N is able to acquire information only from his neighbors.
So, I shall set xij = 0 for j = 2 Ni(g) [ fig throughout the paper.
I turn now to describe how the posterior beliefs of the agents are formed. For two
agents i;j 2 N, i 6= j, let ij : Tj M [0;1] ! [0;1] denote the density corresponding to
agent i's posterior beliefs over agent j's type, given the information acquisition parameter





Since types are independent, an agent can update his beliefs over states by doing sep-
arately the corresponding Bayesian belief revision over each of the other agents' types.
Thus, agent i's posterior beliefs over T can be described by the function i : T Mn 1 





Let Q be the set of all densities on T so that i 2 Q for each agent i.
2.4 Information Acquisition Equilibrium and Ecient Informa-
tion Acquisition
Let us now introduce the notions of equilibrium and eciency.
It is useful rst to specify action strategies. An action strategy for agent i with respect
to coordinate k 6= i of the action space is a function ik : M ! [0;1] that associates his
choice of action over coordinate k, ik(mki) 2 [0;1], to the message that he receives from
agent k, mki 2 M. Since types are independent and all messages are sent simultaneously,
an agent's choice of action over a particular coordinate depends only on the message that
he receives from the expert in that coordinate, as specied. Likewise, an action strategy for
agent i with respect to coordinate i is a function ii : Ti ! [0;1]. Clearly, an agent's choice
of action over the coordinate in which he is the expert depends only on his own initial
private information. An action strategy for agent i is then a function i : TiMn 1 ! Ai
dened as i(ti;mi) := (ii(ti);(ik(mki))k6=i) for each (ti;mi) 2 Ti  Mn 1. Let i be
the set of all action strategies for agent i.
The expected payo of agent i in stage 2 is given by a function Vi;2 : Ai   i  Q 
Ti  Mn(n 1) ! R dened, given his own type ti, a message prole m = (mi;m i), his
14As mentioned earlier, xij = 0 for j = 2 Ni(g) [ fig, i 2 N, so that each agent can indeed use only his
neighbors' message strategies to update his beliefs.
11own action ai = i(ti;mi), a combination of action strategies followed by the other agents









where  i(t i;m i) = (j(tj;mj))j6=i.
For i 2 N and i 2 Q, let the function b i(;i) : Ti  Mn 1 ! Ai dened by
b i(ti;mi;i) := arg maxai2AiVi;2(ai; i;i;ti;mi;m i) for each (ti;mi) 2 Ti  Mn 1 be
agent i's optimal action strategy given his posterior beliefs i.16 For the assumed pref-
erences, the optimal action strategy of an agent i depends on the information that he
acquires (which endows him with beliefs i) but not on the action strategies followed by
the rest of agents,  i. As discussed earlier, strategic interactions over actions are absent
in this model.
The expected payo of agent i in stage 1 is given by a function Vi;1 :   Q ! R




















Equation (5) above gives us agent i's objective function corresponding to the sequential
rationality requirement in stage 1 for the equilibrium concept proposed in this paper, IAE.
With this specication agent i's posterior beliefs are taken into account in his expected
utility at stage 1 through each Vi;2(i(ti;mi); i;i;ti;m), for the various information
sets (ti;m) 2 Ti  Mn(n 1) at stage 2. The idea here is to recognize the role of acquired
information in shaping agent i's perception of his own future payos, and to incorpo-
rate such role into his optimal decision in the stage where he decides about information
acquisition. Using the specication in (5), we see that changes in agent i's information
acquisition choice in stage 1 will change his own perception of his payo in stage 2. Agent
i is then able to anticipate and compute the extent to which such perception changes. The
IAE concept departs from the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the underlying game only
15Let dt :=
Q
k2N dtk and dt i :=
Q
k6=i dtk for i 2 N.
16An agent's optimal action strategy is nothing but an action strategy that satises an additional re-
quirement (it maximizes the agent's expected utility in stage 2 given certain posterior beliefs). Therefore,
as specied for each action strategy, for i 2 N and i 2 Q, let b i(ti;mi;i) := (b ii(ti);(b ik(mki;ik))k6=i)
for each (ti;mi) 2 Ti  Mn 1. Since types are independent and messages are sent simultaneously, agent
i's optimal action strategy over the k-th coordinate of the action space depends only on the message mki
that he receives from agent k, given his posterior beliefs ki.
12in that specication given in equation (5) of expected payos in stage 1.17 In a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium an agent considers in stage 1 only prior beliefs and cares about the
messages and the actions chosen by everyone rather than about the eects induced on
his own posterior beliefs. This makes it an equilibrium notion suitable for signaling and
cheap talk games, where the relevant decisions are about information revelation. How-
ever, if we wish to recognize the role of newly acquired information in shaping posterior
beliefs and induced perceptions of future payos (and to consider that agents are ex-ante
aware of such eects), then the payo specication in (5) seems more suitable to analyze
information acquisition decisions.
In the denition of IAE below, condition (i) requires that each agent's type choose an
expected payo maximizing action in stage 2, taking as given the action strategies followed
by the others and the information acquisition strategies chosen by everyone. Condition
(ii) imposes each agent to choose optimally his information acquisition strategy in stage
1, which gives him his own posterior beliefs, taking as given the information acquisition
strategies chosen by the rest of agents. Condition (iii) simply requires that each agent
use Bayes' rule to update his priors over states.
Denition 1. Given a network g 2 G, an Information Acquisition equilibrium (IAE) is
a triple (;;x) such that, for each i 2 N:
(i) 
i = b i(;
i). (SR2)




i)  Vi;1(b i(;i);

 i;i): (SR1)











ij = 0 for j = 2 Ni(g) [ fig: (BU)
For an agent i 2 N, say that the information acquisition strategy xi 2 Xi induces
beliefs i 2 Q if i is obtained from xi using condition (BU) in Denition 1 above. It
formalizes the way in which information is transmitted between two agents connected
17For the two-agent version of the underlying game, the expression for agent i's expected utility in











This is the expected payo specication in stage 1 that one uses in the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
concept for the underlying two-stage game. Therefore, IAE coincides with perfect Bayesian equilibrium
for the two-agent version of the game. However, such a simplication cannot be obtained for the case
with more than two agents.
13through a link by assuming that posterior beliefs are consistent with Bayesian updating.
To state Bayes' rule as expressed in condition (BU) above, one must combine equations
(2) and (3). Say that the information acquisition prole x 2 X induces the belief prole
 2 Qn if each xi, i 2 N, induces the corresponding i. So, if (;;x) is an IAE, then
x induces .
One may ask whether the fact that agents communicate through a network may lead
to the result that an agent's optimal information acquisition strategy, as described by
conditions (SR2) and (SR1) in Denition 1 above, depends on other agents' information
acquisition strategies. Proposition 2 gives an armative answer to that question so that
this model enables us to analyze strategic interactions only over information acquisition
decisions.
I now describe the eciency benchmark that we shall use to gauge the eciency
properties of IAE. The welfare measure proposed in this paper is the sum of the expected
payo of all the agents in stage 1. Here we require that agents choose optimally their
action strategies in stage 2 and then compare information acquisition proles. Hence, we
consider the possibility that the planner changes the information acquired by the agents,
who will then pay the corresponding new cost of information acquisition and use such
information optimally to choose their actions. As indicated earlier, the expected utility of
an agent in stage 1 incorporates his own perception of his expected utility in stage 2 using
the posterior beliefs resulting from his information acquisition decisions. In contrast,
the ex-ante welfare function is evaluated from the planner's perspective. Therefore, the
agents' posterior beliefs are not considered in the proposed welfare function in stage 1.
Formally,
Denition 2. Given a network g 2 G and an information acquisition prole x 2 X that
induces a belief prole  2 Qn, the welfare function evaluated in stage 2 is the function






b i(ti;mi;i); b  i(t i;m i; i);t;r

;
where b  i(t i;m i; i) := (b j(tj;mj;j))j6=i.
Denition 3. Given a network g 2 G, x 2 X is an ecient information acquisition
prole if it induces a belief prole  that maximizes the welfare function evaluated in






















2.5 A Two-Agent Example
As an antidote to the complexity of the ingredients of the previous subsections, I now
work out an example for the particular case where n = 2 to illustrate the model. Consider
N = f1;2g and the network g = f12g so that each agent is able to acquire information
from the other. Following the development of the previous subsections, the type space
of the agents is T1 = T2 = [0;1], and the state space is T = [0;1]  [0;1] with typical
element t = (t1;t2), where t1 2 T1 and t2 2 T2. The action space of the agents is
A1 = A2 = T = [0;1]  [0;1] and an action for agent i = 1;2 is ai = (ai1;ai2). Thus,
an action prole is a = (a11;a12;a21;a22) 2 A = A1  A2 = [0;1]4. The payo to agent
i = 1;2 is given by the expression
Ui(a;t;r) =  (1   r)

(t1   ai1)





2 + (t2   a(3 i)2)
2
:
As for the information transmission process, each agent i = 1;2 has a set of messages
M = [0;1] available to transmit information about his own type to the other agent. Using
the notation introduced in subsection 2.3, m1 = m21 and m2 = m12 denote, respectively,
the message received by agent 1 (from agent 2) and the message received by agent 2 (from
agent 1). Also, x1 = x12 and x2 = x21 denote, respectively, the information acquisition
strategy for agent 1 (to acquire information from agent 2) and the information acquisition
strategy for agent 2 (to acquire information from agent 1).
In this example, a message strategy for agent i = 1;2, given the information acquisition
strategy x3 i chosen by the other agent, is simply
i(m3 ijti;x3 i) = (1   x3 i)f(m3 i) + x3 iI(m3 ijti):
Accordingly, the induced beliefs for agent 3   i (i = 1;2) over agent i's type are given by
3 i(tijm3 i;x3 i) = (1   x3 i)f(ti) + x3 iI(m3 ijti):
The action choice of agent i = 1;2, given his own type ti 2 [0;1] and the message
mi 2 [0;1] that he receives from agent 3   i, is given by his action strategy i:
ai = (ai1;ai2) = i(ti;mi) = (ii(ti);i(3 i)(mi)):
15I proceed by computing the optimal action strategy and the optimal information ac-
quisition strategy for the agents. For the sake of clarity, I will write down the arguments
only for a given agent, say agent i = 1, but will also derive the analogous implications for
agent 2.
Consider a given information acquisition prole x = (x1;x2) 2 [0;1]  [0;1] that
induces a belief prole  = (1;2). From the expression above for the payo to agent
i = 1 together with (4) agent 1's expected payo in stage 2, given type t1 2 [0;1] and
















(1   x1)f(t2) + x1I(m1jt2)

(t1   a11)







(1   x1)f(t2) + x1I(m1jt2)

(t1   21(m2))
2 + (t2   22(t2))
2
dt2;
where a1 = (a11;a12) = 1(t1;m1) = (11(t1);12(m1)). From the expression above it
follows that a
11 = t1 and (using the expression analog to the one above for agent 2)

22(t2) = t2 correspond to the optimal action strategy of the agents. Using this, we can
rewrite the expression above for agent 1's expected payo in stage 2, when both agents's























From the expression above (and from the analog one for agent 2), we obtain that a
12 =
(1   x1) + x1m1 and 
21(m2) = (1   x2) + x2m2 correspond to the optimal action





2;1;t1;m) =   (1   r)(1   x1)






t1   (1   x2)   x2m2
2:
Now, using (5) together with the expressions obtained above for both agents' message
strategies, the expression for agent 1's expected payo in stage 1, when both agents's

























16By substituting the expression of agent 1's expected payo in stage 2, V1;2(
1(t1;m1);
2;1;t1;m),
obtained earlier, into the expression above and by doing the algebra, we nally obtain
V1;1(
;1) =  (1   r)(1   x
2
1)




Therefore, the optimal information acquisition strategy of agent 1 is given by (i) x
1 =
0 , c  (1   r)2, (ii) x
1 = 1 , c  (1   r)2, and (iii) x
1 2 f0;1g , c = (1   r)2,
regardless of the information acquisition strategy chosen by agent 2. Of course, for agent
2 one obtains an analogous optimal information acquisition strategy.
I turn now to study ecient information acquisition in this example. Addition of
the payos of the two agents, when both of them choose their optimal action strategies,
together with the expressions above for such optimal strategies, gives us the following














t2   (1   x1)   x1m1
2 +
 
t1   (1   x2)   x2m2
2:


















(1   x1)f(m1) + x1I(m1jt2)

W2(t1;t2;m1;m2;1;2)dm2dm1dt2dt2   c[x1 + x2]:
Then, by substituting the expression for the welfare function evaluated in stage 2 obtained
earlier into the expression above and by doing the algebra, it can be checked that the
expression for the welfare function evaluated in stage 1 in equation (6) becomes
W1(x) =  2
2 + x1[x1
2   c] + x2[x2
2   c]:
Therefore, the ecient information acquisition prole (x1;x2) must satisfy, for each i =
1;2, (i) xi = 0 , c  2, (ii) xi = 1 , c  2, and (iii) xi 2 f0;1g , c = 2.
In this example we observe that the (possible) discrepancy between the ecient and
the equilibrium information acquisition proles is due to the team concern. This example
illustrates the main ingredients of the model but it does not allow us to obtain insights
for the case where the agents are indeed connected through a network. In particular,
under the requirement imposed by the IAE notion that agents correctly anticipate the
role of information in shaping their posterior beliefs (and incorporate it in their informa-
tion acquisition decisions), interesting strategic interactions over information acquisition
decisions arise when more than two agents are connected through a network. Thus, the
fact that the agents acquire information through a network plays an essential role in this
model. The rest of the paper is devoted to that analysis.
173 Eciency and Equilibrium
This section characterizes both the set of ecient information acquisition proles and the
set of IAE, and relates the compatibility between them to the network density.
I start by studying the optimal action strategies followed by the agents. For i;k 2 N,













denote, respectively, the expected value and the variance of type tk for the received mes-
sage mki, given the information acquisition parameter xik. Thus, by applying the belief
revision rule specied in (BU) to agent i, with respect to agent k's type, one obtains
E[tkjmki;xik] = (1   xik) + xikmki; (7)
and
Var[tkjmki;xik] = (1   xik)


2 + xik(mki   )
2
: (8)
Since the expected payo of each agent in stage 2 is concave with respect to his own
action, agent i's optimal action strategy b i(;i), i 2 Q, is given by the rst order
conditions
b ii(ti) = ti and b ik(mki;ik) = E[tkjmki;xik] for each k 6= i; (9)
where xi induces i. Thus, each agent chooses optimally his expectation of the underlying
state t according to the posteriors that he obtains with the information acquired from his
neighbors.
I turn now to characterize the ecient information acquisition proles.
3.1 Ecient Information Acquisition
Using the payo specication given by equation (1) and the specication of the welfare







tk   b ik(mki;ik)
2:
Hence, a social planner who faces the problem of maximizing the welfare function evalu-
ated in stage 2 seeks to keep the action of each agent close to the underlying state and
ignores the team concern of each agent. This is due to the fact that agents are ex-ante
18identical so that the in
uence of each agent's action on any other agent's payo is homoge-
nous across agents. Therefore, the ecient information acquisition prole is characterized
by the condition that ensures the optimal behavior of each agent with respect to infor-
mation acquisition in the limit case where the team concern is absent, i.e., when r = 0,
as provided by Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1. Let g 2 G and let x be an ecient information acquisition prole. Then,
for each agent i 2 N and each neighbor k 2 Ni(g), either
(i) xik = 0 if and only if c  2,
(ii) xik = 1 if and only if c  2, or
(iii) xik 2 f0;1g if and only if c = 2.
Consider an ecient information acquisition prole x 2 X. From the assumed homo-
geneity with respect to the variance of the agents' types, together with the fact that the
information acquisition cost is identical for all agents, it follows that18
x = 0 , c  
2 (10)
and
x = 1 , c  
2: (11)
That is, for c 6= 2, in an ecient information acquisition prole either all the agents
acquire full information from their neighbors or acquire no information at all.
Proposition 2 in Subsection 3.3 characterizes the best response information acquisition
strategy of an agent|as a function of the information acquisition strategies taken by the
rest of agents. It shows that, for a given network g 2 G, the incentives of each agent
i 2 N to acquire full information in an IAE from a neighbor k 2 Ni(g) increase with
the amount of information that the rest of neighbors of agent k acquire from him. Thus,
under the sequential rationality requirement in stage 1 imposed by the IAE concept,
positive informational spillovers over actions induce a certain degree of coordination (in
the same direction) over the information acquisition strategies followed by the agents at
equilibrium. Before stating the formal result, I provide an example in the next subsection,
for a network involving three agents, that illustrates the forces behind that coordination
eect.19
18The notation 0 and 1 denotes, respectively, the vector (0;0; ;0) and the vector (1;1; ;1) in a
space of conformal dimension.
19I am grateful to Dragan Filipovich for suggesting me to provide an example along these lines.
193.2 A Three-Agent Example
Consider N = f1;2;3g and the network g = f12;23g. In this example we ask ourselves:
why should, in an IAE, the amount of information that agent 1 acquires from 2 depend
on the amount of information that 3 acquires from 2?
To address this question, it suces to account for that part of agent 1's expected
payo due to the team concern. Using the payo specication in (1), we see that agent
1 cares about  kt   a3k2. In particular, he wishes that the dierence (t2   a32)2 be
minimized, i.e., he cares about the extent to which agent 3 solves aspect 2 (for which
agent 2 is the expert) of his problem. Notice that agent 1 is risk averse with respect to
agent 3's choice over the second coordinate of the state of world. From (7), we know
that, given a message m23 received from agent 2, agent 3's optimal action choice over the
second aspect of the problem is given by his expectation of that coordinate according to
the induced posteriors 32 (that he obtains from his information acquisition decision x32
regarding agent 2). That is,
b 32(m23;32) = E[t2jm23;x32] = (1   x32) + x32m23:
First, suppose that agent 3 acquires no information at all from agent 2. Then, for
each message m23 2 [0;1] received by agent 3 from agent 2, agent 1 knows that agent 3
optimally chooses b 32(m23;32) = , so that agent 1 cares about  (t2   )2. Thus, the
only source of uncertainty aecting agent 1 is with respect to t2.
If agent 1 decides to acquire no information at all from agent 2, then at stage 1 he
knows that at stage 2 he would compute  (t2 )2 according to his priors f(t2), obtaining
expected payo  2 in stage 2. Consequently, he knows that at stage 1 he would compute
 2 again according to his priors f(t2). Thus the component of his expected payo in
stage 1 due to concern  (t2   a32)2 and to his information acquisition decision amounts
to  2.
If, on the other hand, agent 1 decides to acquire full information from agent 2, then at
stage 1 he knows that at stage 2 he would know the true value of  (t2 )2. However, at
stage 1 he does not know the way in which  relates to t2. In particular, he does not know
whether t2 coincides with  or not, and, consequently, he continues to compute  (t2 )2
according to his priors f(t2). Then, the component of his expected payo in stage 1 due
to concern  (t2   a32)2 and to his information acquisition decision amounts to  2   c.
So long as c > 0 agent 1 prefers, regarding component  (t2   a32)2 of his payo (and
other things being equal), to acquire no information from agent 2 when agent 3 acquires
no information from agent 2.
Second, suppose that agent 3 acquires full information from agent 2. Then, for a
20given message m23 2 [0;1] received by agent 3 from agent 2, agent 1 knows that agent
3 optimally chooses b 32(m23;32) = m23, so that agent 1 cares now about  (t2   m23)2.
So, there are now two sources of uncertainty aecting agent 1 (over this component of his
payos), one due to t2, the other corresponding to m23. Agent 1 can use the information
that he acquires from agent 2 to improve his knowledge about the way in which m23
relates to t2. Notice that, even though agent 1 knows the value of x32, his information
about the particular message m23 depends on the amount of information about t2 that
he acquires.
If agent 1 decides to acquire no information at all from agent 2, then at stage 1 he knows
that at stage 2 he would compute  (t2   m23)2 using his priors f(m23). Consequently,
he knows that at stage 1 he would compute  
R 1
0 (t2   m23)2f(m23)dm23 using his priors
f(t2). Thus, the component of his expected payo in stage 1 due to concern  (t2  a32)2
and to his information acquisition decision amounts to  22 in stage 1.
If, on the other hand, agent 1 decides to acquire full information from agent 2, then
at stage 1 he knows that at stage 2 he would compute  (t2   m23)2 knowing exactly the
way in which m23 relates to t2 for agent 2's message strategy with respect to agent 3.
Therefore, agent 1 knows at stage 1 that at stage 2 he would know (i) that m23 coincides
with t2 and (ii) the exact value of m23. Consequently, agent 1 knows that at stage 2 he
would compute a zero expected payo. Then, at stage 1 he would compute a zero payo
according to his priors f(t2), so that the component of his expected payo in stage 1 due
to concern  (t2   a32)2 and to his information acquisition decision amounts to  c.
We see that agent 1 is more inclined to acquire full information from agent 2 when
agent 3 acquires full information from agent 2 than in the case where agent 3 acquires no
information from agent 2.
In this example, agent 3's information acquisition decisions from agent 2 aect the
relation between agent 1's information acquisition decisions from agent 2 and his own
(anticipated) posterior perception of the expected value of  (t2   a32)2. Note that the
IAE concept imposes that the posterior beliefs over t2 of agent 1 and of agent 3 enter agent
1's expected payo in stage 1 in a multiplicative way. This implies that the information
a acquisition parameters x12 and x32 enter also agent 1's expected payo in stage 1 in a
multiplicative way, which leads to the result that the information acquisition decisions of
agents 1 and 3 are interdependent at equilibrium when information acquisition is costly.
3.3 Information Acquisition Equilibrium
The next proposition characterizes the best response information acquisition strategies of
the agents.
21Proposition 2. Let g 2 G and let (;;x) be an IAE. Then, for each agent i 2 N
and each neighbor k 2 Ni(g), either
(i) x
ik = 0 if and only if c  2
h








ik = 1 if and only if c  2
h








ik 2 f0;1g if and only if c = 2
h







Since we are considering an externality, with the form of the team concern, one might
expect that the conditions that characterize the set of equilibria (provided by Proposition 2
above) do not coincide with those characterizing the set of ecient information acquisition
proles (provided by Proposition 1). The forces behind this discrepancy for this set-up
are, however, more subtle than those involved in traditional ineciency results in the
presence of externalities. The fact that the agents' expected payos in stage 1 incorporate
their expected payos in stage 2 using their own posterior beliefs is crucial to explain the
dierences between ecient and equilibrium information acquisition.
In this model, the information that an agent i 2 N acquires from a neighbor k 2 Ni(g)
shapes his own beliefs about the underlying state as well as about the extent to which the
optimal action of any other neighbor of agent k, j 2 Nk(g)nfig approaches the true state.
In other words, by changing his information acquisition decision, agent i changes the way
in which he anticipates his perception of the extent to which agent j 2 Nk(g)nfig solves
aspect k of his own problem. This is mathematically expressed by the fact that, under
the sequential rationality condition in stage 1 imposed by the IAE concept, the posterior
beliefs of agent i and of agent j about tk enter agent i's expected utility at stage 1 in
a multiplicative way. Finally, note that, to obtain the result stated in Proposition 2, is
crucial that (i) information acquisition be costly, that (ii) agent i cares about agent j's
action choice over coordinate k of the action space, and that (iii) agent i be risk averse
with respect to the dierence tk   ajk.
An obvious consequence of Proposition 2 is that, in equilibrium, it is less likely that a
hub in a network acquires full information from the agents in his periphery than each of
the agents in the periphery acquire full information from that particular hub. Also, the
likelihood with which an agent in the periphery of a hub acquires full information from
that hub increases with the number of agents in the periphery of the hub. To see this,
consider the star network g = f12;13;:::;1ng. It follows from Proposition 2 (ii) that
there exists an IAE where each agent in the periphery of agent 1 acquires full information
from that hub if 0  c  2
h
(1   r) + 2rn 2
n 1
i
. If we consider a large group so that
n ! 1, then there exists an IAE where each agent in the periphery of agent 1 acquires
full information from that hub if 0  c  2(1 + r). In contrast, in equilibrium, agent 1
22acquires full information from an agent in the periphery only if 0  c  2(1   r).
Another consequence of Proposition 2 is that the incentives of the agents to ac-
quire full information from their neighbors in a network increase with the minimum and
maximum degrees of that network. To see this, consider the complete circle network
g = f12;23;:::;(n   1)ng so that (g) = (g) = 2. From Proposition 2 (ii), it follows
that there is an IAE where each agent acquires full information from his neighbors if and
only if 0  c  2
h
(1   r) + 2r 1
n 1
i
. If we consider a large group so that n ! 1, that
condition becomes 0  c  2(1   r). This gives us an upper bound on the cost lower
than that ensuring that each agent in the periphery of the hub acquires full information
from that hub in a star network, as shown above.
3.4 Equilibrium, Eciency, and the Network Density
Despite the linearity assumptions used in this paper, the best response information ac-
quisition strategies characterized by Proposition 2 still allow for the existence of multiple
IAE for a broad class of networks. To compare ecient and equilibrium information ac-
quisition proles, it is useful to use Proposition 2 to characterize IAE where either all the
agents acquire full information from their neighbors or acquire no information at all.
Let us dene (a(g);n) := maxf2[a(g)   1]=(n   1);0g where a(g) 2 f(g);(g)g.
That is, (a(g);n) is a function strictly increasing with a(g), a(g) 2 f(g);(g)g, i.e.,
with the minimum and the maximum degrees of network g, and strictly decreasing with
the number of agents in N. Thus, (a(g);n), a(g) 2 f(g);(g)g, can be understood
as measures of the degree of density of network g relative to the size of the organiza-
tion/group.
Consider an information acquisition prole x 2 X corresponding to an IAE. It follows
from Proposition 2 (i) that
x
 = 0 , c  
2(1   r): (12)
On the other hand, Proposition 2 (ii) implies that
x
 = 1 , c  
2[(1   r) + r((g);n)]: (13)
Notice that an IAE equilibrium for each of the regions of the information acquisition cost
delimited by equations (12) and (13) above is not necessarily unique. It needs not be so
even when one restricts attention to IAE where either each agent acquires full information
or each agent acquires no information at all. To see this, notice that 2(1   r)  2[(1  
r) + r((g);n)] for each g 2 G and each n  3 since ((g);n)  0 for each g 2 G
and each n  3. Therefore, for 2(1   r)  c  2[(1   r) + r((g);n)], both x = 0
and x = 1 correspond to IAE. It can be easily checked that this is the only case where
23multiplicity of equilibria arises when one restricts attention to IAE where either all the
agents acquire full information from their neighbors or acquire no information at all.
Corollary 1. Let g 2 G be a network such that (g)  n+1
2 . Then, for each r 2 [0;1]
and each c 2 R+, for each ecient information acquisition prole x 2 X there exists a
belief prole  2 Qn induced by x such that (;;x) is an IAE.
Proof. First, suppose that 0  c  2. Then, using (11), we know that x = 1 is the
ecient information acquisition prole. Since (g)  n+1
2 , ((g);n)  1 for each
n  3 and each r 2 [0;1], we know that 0  c  2 implies necessarily 0  c 
2[(1   r) + r((g);n)] for each n  3. But then, using (13), one obtains that x = 1
corresponds to an IAE.
Second, suppose that c  2. Then, using (10), we know that x = 0 is the ecient
information acquisition prole. But then c  2(1   r) for each r 2 [0;1] so that, using
(12), we obtain that x = 0 corresponds to an IAE. 2
The result in Corollary 1 allows us to relate the network density to the compatibility
between equilibrium and ecient information acquisition. In particular, if the minimum
degree of the network is high enough relative to the size of the organization/group, then
each ecient information acquisition prole can be reached in an IAE.
However, one must consider the comparison between equilibrium and ecient infor-
mation acquisition obtained from Corollary 1 with due care since, as mentioned earlier,
there are multiple IAE for some regions of the cost. In particular, for r 2 (0;1], using
(12), one obtains that, regardless of the network architecture, if 2(1   r) < c < 2, then
there exists an IAE where all the agents acquire no information at all from his neigh-
bors. However, it follows from (11) that the ecient information prole for cost in that
interval requires that all the agents acquire full information, regardless of the network
architecture.
Corollary 2. Let g 2 G be a network such that (g) < n+1
2 . Then, for each r 2 (0;1]
and each 2[(1   r) + r((g);n)] < c < 2, each agent acquires full information from
each of his neighbors in the ecient information acquisition prole whereas at least some
agent acquires no information at all in the information acquisition prole corresponding
to each IAE.
Proof. Since (g) < n+1
2 , ((g);n) < 1 for each n  3 and each r 2 (0;1], we know that
2[(1 r)+r((g);n)] < 2. So, suppose that 2[(1 r)+r((g);n)] < c < 2. Then,
from (11), we know that x = 1 is the ecient information acquisition prole. However,
24since c > 2[(1 r)+r((g);n)], the result in Proposition (i) implies that at least some
agent acquires no information at all in each IAE. 2
Obviously, the existence of multiple IAE does not impose any qualication to the
message conveyed by Corollary 2 since it identies a region of the information acquisition
cost where all IAE are inecient.
The intuition behind the results in Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 is as follows. By
comparing the result in Proposition 1 with that in Proposition 2, we observe that the
(possible) discrepancy between ecient and equilibrium information acquisition is driven
by the coordination eect (in the same direction) identied in Proposition 2. For informa-
tion acquisition cost relatively high, c > 2, this coordination eect has no in
uence on
the agents' decisions for one of the possible equilibria (the one with no information acqui-
sition). So, one obtains that an equilibrium information acquisition prole coincides with
the ecient one. However, for lower values of the information acquisition cost, c < 2,
such a coordination eect does in
uence the agents' decisions at each equilibrium. If
c < 2, full information acquisition of each agent from each of his neighbors corresponds
to the ecient prole. Then, given the coordination eect, an agent i 2 N will choose, at
equilibrium, to acquire full information from a neighbor k 2 Ni(g) if the number of other
neighbors of agent k that acquire full information from him is relatively high. For this to
happen, agent k needs to be \minimally connected" in network g. Since we are looking
at equilibria where all the agents either acquire full information or acquire no information
at all, the fact that each agent k 2 N be minimally connected is a sucient condition to
guarantee eciency of the equilibrium prole. The minimal connectivity condition that
we obtain, (g)  n+1
2 , requires that the minimum degree of network g be larger than half
of the size of the group.
Corollary 3. Consider a network g 2 G and suppose that r 2 [0;1]. Then:
(i) For each 0 < c < 2(1 r), the ecient information acquisition prole coincides with
the information acquisition prole corresponding to the unique IAE. In this IAE, each
agent acquires full information from each of his neighbors.
(ii) If (g)  n+1
2 , then, for each c > 2[(1   r) + r((g);n)] the ecient information
acquisition prole coincides with the information acquisition prole corresponding to the
unique IAE. In this IAE, each agent acquires no information at all from each of his
neighbors. Moreover, if (g) < n+1
2 , then the same conclusion holds for each c > 2.
Proof. (i) Clearly, 0 < c < 2(1 r) implies 0 < c < 2 for each r 2 [0;1]. So, using (11),
we know that, for each 0 < c < 2(1   r), the ecient information acquisition prole is
25x = 1. Also, since, for each r 2 [0;1] and each i 2 N,


























Proposition 2 (ii) implies that x = 1 is the information acquisition prole corresponding
to the unique IAE when c < 2(1   r).
(ii) First suppose that (g)  n+1
2 . Then, ((g);n)  1 and, therefore, 2[(1  
r) + r((g);n)]  2 for each r 2 [0;1]. So, using (10), we know that, for each c >
2[(1   r) + r((g);n)], the ecient information acquisition prole is x = 0. Also, since
for each r 2 [0;1] and each i 2 N,


























Proposition 2 (i) implies that x = 0 is the information acquisition prole corresponding
to the unique IAE when c > 2[(1   r) + r((g);n)].
Finally, suppose that (g) < n+1
2 . Then, ((g);n) < 1 and, therefore, 2[(1   r) +
r((g);n)] < 2 for each r 2 [0;1]. So, since c > 2 implies c > 2[(1 r)+r((g);n)],
we can use again the arguments above to obtain that, for c > 2, the ecient information
acquisition prole is x = 0 and x = 0 is the information acquisition prole corresponding
to the unique IAE. 2
Corollary 3 gives us sucient conditions for each ecient information acquisition pro-
le to coincide with that at the unique equilibrium. In particular, the sucient condition
provided by Corollary 3 (ii) depends on whether the maximum degree of the network
exceeds n+1
2 or not. It can be easily checked that the lower bound identied in Corollary
3 (ii) increases with the maximum degree of the network on the interval [2;2(1 + r)].
Thus, Corollary 3 (ii) may seem to convey the message that, for values of the information
acquisition cost high enough, c 2 [2;2(1 + r)], the compatibility between ecient and
equilibrium information acquisition is favored when the maximum degree of the network
is relatively low. However, Corollary 3 (ii) gives us just a sucient condition on the ex-
istence of a unique ecient IAE prole. As shown by Corollary 2, even for cost in the
interval [2;2(1 + r)], there exists an ecient IAE prole when the minimum degree of
the network is relatively high ((g)  n+1
2 ).
The intuition behind the result in Corollary 3 (ii) is as follows. If c 2 [2;2(1 + r)],
agents acquire no information at all in the ecient information acquisition prole. Then,
26given the coordination eect identied in Proposition 2, an agent i 2 N will choose,
at equilibrium, to acquire no information from a neighbor k 2 Ni(g) if the number of
other neighbors of agent k that acquire no information from him is relatively high. A
sucient condition for this to happen is, clearly, that the number of neighbors of agent k
be relatively low.
Furthermore, Corollary 3 implies that, for either suciently low or suciently high
values of the information acquisition cost, the ecient information acquisition behavior
coincides with that at equilibrium, regardless of the network architecture. This result is
provided formally by Corollary 4 below.
Corollary 4. Consider a network g 2 G and suppose that r 2 [0;1]. If either 0  c 
2(1   r) or c  2(1 + r), then each ecient information acquisition prole coincides
with the information acquisition prole corresponding to the unique IAE.
The result in Corollary 4 is a straightforward consequence of Corollary 3 combined
with the fact that, from the denition of (a(g);n), a(g) 2 f(g);(g)g, we have
0  ((g);n)  ((g);n)  2 
n   2
n   1
< 2 for each g 2 G and each n  3:
Therefore,

2(1   r)  
2[(1   r) + r((g);n)]  
2[(1   r) + r((g);n)] < 
2(1 + r)
is satised for each g 2 G and each n  3.
The intuition behind the result in Corollary 4 is simply that, for either very low or
very high values of the cost, the coordination eect identied in Proposition 2 becomes of
no importance for the agents' incentives to acquire information. This leads to the result
that the IAE prole coincides with the ecient one.
4 Robustness and Justications of the Model
This paper has studied both equilibrium and eciency properties of the information ac-
quisition phenomenon through networks by using a specic description of the information
transmission process and by making specic assumptions on payos. In this section, I
discuss the robustness of the model by analyzing the implications of changing some of the
assumptions.
The rst subsection below discusses the implications of assuming an alternative infor-
mation transmission process where the agents receive a Normal signal consisting of the
true type plus some noise. The second subsection studies whether the main implications
27of the model continue to hold under a payo perturbation that introduces a convex cost
function.
4.1 Normal Signals
Following the approach pursued by recent works on the social value of information and on
communication networks,20 let us consider an alternative description of the information
transmission process. Assume that each type ti is drawn according to a Normal distri-
bution with mean  and variance 2. As a consequence of his information acquisition
decisions, each agent i 2 N receives from each of his neighbors k 2 Ni(g) a private signal
yki := tk +ki where ki is an idiosyncratic noise normaly distributed with mean zero and
variance &2
ki. Furthermore, for each i 2 N, assume that: (i) tk and ki are independent for
each k 6= i, and (ii) ki and ji are independent for each k;j 2 N such that k 6= i, j 6= i,
and k 6= j. The rest of the game is identical to the one described in Section 2.
Then, it can be checked that agent i's posterior beliefs about type tk, k 6= i, conditional
on receiving signal yki, are given by a Normal distribution with mean E[tkjyki] = 
yki +
(1   
) and variance Var[tkjyki] satisfying 
 = Var[tkjyki]=(2 + &2
ki), where 
 2 [0;1].
Therefore, since an agent's expected payos are concave with respect to his own action,
his optimal action strategy for a given coordinate k 6= i consists of a linear combination
between the mean of type tk (using prior beliefs) and the signal yki that he receives from
agent k. The class of message strategies chosen in this paper leads to the same conclusion,
as implied by equation (7).
Furthermore, Var[tkjyki]=(2 + &2
ki) increases with 
, and one obtains the limit cases:
(a) if 
 ! 1, then Var[tkjyki]  2+&2
ki whereas (b) if 
 ! 0, then &2
ki ! 1 for a bounded
Var[tkjyki]. This implication that the variance of the type (conditioned on the signal)
increases with 
 2 [0;1] is anologous to the one obtained in this paper, as derived from
equation (8). The corresponding implication obtained in this paper is that the variance
of an unknown agent's type, from the perspective of the agent that acquires information
from him, decreases with the amount of information that he acquires.
Thus, given the assumed payos, this alternative benchmark for information transmis-
sion with normal signals permits us to obtain implications qualitatively similar to those
derived from the message strategies considered in this paper. In particular, in both bench-
marks, one obtains that each agent's optimal action strategy (for a given dimension of the
action space) is linear with respect to the received signal, according to a certain weight
parameter. In addition, the variance of an unknown agent's type, conditional upon the
received signal, decreases with such a weight parameter. This paper has analyzed infor-
20See, e.g., Angeletos and Pavan [3], and Calv o-Armengol and de Mart  [8].
28mation acquisition by allowing the agents to choose endogenously the value of that weight
parameter.
4.2 Non-linear Information Acquisition Cost
This paper has concentrated on the analysis of both ecient and equilibrium information
acquisition strategies where agents either acquire full information or acquire no infor-
mation at all. The result that the planner and the agents make corner choices in their
respective decision problems (i.e., xik 2 f0;1g for each k 2 Ni(g) and each i 2 N) is driven
by the assumed message strategies and by the assumption of linear information acquisi-
tion cost. This has made tractable the problem of comparing ecient and equilibrium
information acquisition proles.
One may wonder, however, whether the results obtained here would change under a
slightly modied class of preferences that allows for the study of choices about information
acquisition given by interior solutions (i.e., xik 2 (0;1) for each k 2 Ni(g) and each i 2 N).
To answer this, I consider a payo perturbation by assuming that each agent i 2 N
incurs a cost of information acquisition with respect to each neighbor k 2 Ni(g) given by
a (twice dierentiable) cost function c : [0;1] ! R+ satisfying: (i) c0(x) > 0 for each x 2
(0;1], (ii) c0(0) = 0 and c0(1) > 22(1+r), and (iii) c00(x) > 22(1+r) for each x 2 [0;1].
Condition (ii) above ensures that the planner and the agents make interior choices in
their respective decision problems with respect to information acquisition. Condition (iii)
guarantees that the respective information acquisition decision problems for the planner
and the agents are concave. The rest of the game is identical to the one presented in
Section 2.
Under the alternative assumption introduced above, one obtains the following results
regarding ecient and equilibrium information acquisition behavior. They are analogs to
those provided by Proposition 1 and Proposition 2.
Proposition 3. Let g 2 G and let x be an ecient information acquisition prole. Then,
for each agent i 2 N and each neighbor k 2 Ni(g), the information adquisition parameter





Proposition 4. Let g 2 G and let (;;x) be an IAE. Then, for each agent i 2 N
and each neighbor k 2 Ni(g), for each given x
 i 2 X i, the information acquisition
29parameter x
ik satises x



















Let us see brie
y whether the earlier result (obtained in Proposition 2) stating that
the incentives of an agent to acquire information from a given neighbor increase with
the amount of information that the rest of neighbors of that neighbor acquire from him
continues to apply. Consider a network g 2 G. For a given agent i 2 N and a given
neighbor k 2 Ni(g), let us dene the function
H(xik;y) :=
h








ik   c(xik)  
h










jk. The proof of Proposition 4 shows that agent i chooses op-
timally the amount of information that he acquires from his neighbor k if and only if
he chooses x
ik 2 [0;1] so as to maximize H(xik;y). Therefore, the rst order condi-
tion @H(x
ik;y)=@xik = 0 gives us equation (15) above. Furthermore, it can be checked
that @2H(xik;y)=@xik@y  0 for each xik 2 [0;1] and each y  0. Then, using Topkis'
Monotonicity Theorem,21 one obtains that x
ik is an increasing function with respect to y.
Hence, under this alternative cost specication, the result that the agents wish to
coordinate their information acquisition decisions in the same direction continues to apply.
This is important since the results of this paper relating the network density to the
compatibility between ecient and equilibrium information acquisition rely strongly on
that coordination eect.
It would be interesting to analyze the compatibility between ecient and equilibrium
information acquisition proles under this alternative cost specication. However, we
observe that equation (15) characterizes a multiplicity of IAE where the agents make
interior choices. Consequently, some selection criterion would be necessary in order to
carry out that welfare analysis.
5 Concluding Comments
This paper considered a multi-agent information transmission model, in terms of Bayesian
belief revision processes, to analyze information acquisition decisions by agents involved
in a network. The environment investigated here is one with no con
ict of interests over
actions and with positive informational spillovers. The IAE concept, that incorporates the
role of the newly acquired information in shaping own (anticipated) perception of future
21See, e.g., Topkis [22].
30expected payos into the agent's sequential rationality requirements, has been proposed
to analyze information acquisition decisions. The main contributions of this paper were
(i) to propose an appealing game theoretical solution concept, IAN, to study information
acquisition decisions within networked groups, (ii) to characterize both the ecient and
the equilibrium behavior with respect to information acquisition, and (iii) to relate the
compatibility between ecient and equilibrium information acquisition to the network
density.
One may expect that the results of this paper hold in a wide class of environments
where the information structure features complementarities, where there are no strategic
interactions over actions, and where each agent cares about his own action and wishes
the others to align theirs with the true state. Although the assumptions of the model
are specic, they do not appear to be essential for its main results to follow. In this
respect, quadratic payos can be considered as a second-order approximation of a more
general class of convex preferences. The chosen payos over actions, together with the
chosen message strategies and the linearity assumption on the cost function, are crucial
to obtain that, in equilibrium, an agent acquires either full information or no information
at all from a given neighbor. This alleviates the problem of multiplicity of equilibria,
making tractable the welfare exercise of comparing ecient and equilibrium information
acquisition proles.
However, the results obtained here need not extend to environments with strategic
complementarities over actions and/or a second-guessing coordination motive in payos,
as it is the case under the class of preferences proposed, for example, by Morris and Shin
[18], Angeletos and Pavan [3], Calv o-Armengol and de Mart  [8], and Hagenbach and
Koessler [13]. For these models, strategic interactions over actions are rich and constitute
an important part of their analyses. In contrast, this work has concentrated only on the
study of strategic interactions over information acquisition decisions.
Finally, this paper assumed that information cannot be transmitted through agents
indirectly linked in a network. It would be interesting to investigate the information
acquisition problem when such a network eect is allowed for.
Appendix
This appendix is devoted to the proofs of the various propositions.




2 denote agent i's square forecast error about tk, conditioned on receiving
message mki, given the piece of information xik that he acquires from agent k. Using
31equation (7), one then easily obtains




2   2xik(tk   )(mki   ): (16)
With this in hand, let us proceed to the proofs of the propositions.
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider a network g 2 G. The optimal action strategy in
equation (9), together with the expression for the square forecast error in equation (16),

























xik(tk   )(mki   ):
By combining the expression above with equation (6), we can write the welfare function
evaluated in stage 1 as

































ki(mkijtk;xik)(tk   )(mki   )dmki dtk:
(17)
I proceed by expressing each of the terms in equation (17) as a function of the information
acquired by the agents. Consider an agent i 2 N and an agent k 2 Ni(g). Applying the













































32So, by substituting equations (18) and (19) into equation (17), we can express the welfare
function evaluated in stage 1 as







2   c]: (20)
Let  (xik) := xik[xik2   c]. Given the parabolic shape of function  , we obtain that the
welfare function evaluated in stage 1 is maximized according to: for each i 2 N and each
k 2 Ni(g), (i) xik = 1 if and only if c  2, (ii) xik = 0 if and only if c  2, and (iii)
xik 2 f0;1g if and only if c = 2, as stated. 2
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider a network g 2 G. Consider an agent i 2 N, a type
ti 2 Ti, a message prole m = (mi;m i) 2 Mn(n 1), and an information acquisition
prole x 2 X that induces a belief prole  2 Qn. Substitution of equation (1) into
equation (4), gives us the following expression for the expected payo of agent i in stage
2:














































By substituting the optimal action strategies in equation (9) into equation (21) above,
we can write the expected payo of agent i 2 N for (ti;m) 2 Ti  Mn(n 1), when all the
agents choose their optimal action strategies, as




















Now, using equations (5) and (22), we can write agent i's expected payo in stage 1, when
33all the agents choose their optimal action strategies, as













































I proceed by expressing each of the rst three terms that appear in expression (23) above
as a function of the agents' information acquisition parameters.
As regards the rst term, consider an agent k 6= i. Then, applying the parameterization
of message strategies in (2) to agent k and the expression for the variance of tk for the

































ik(1   xik)(   )
2
d





As for the second term in expression (23), consider an agent j 6= i. Applying the
parameterization of message strategies in (2) and the expression of the square forecast































































34As for the third term in expression (23), consider two agents, j 6= i and k 6= i, such
that j 6= k. Application of the belief Bayesian updating rule specied in (BU) to agent i
with respect to agent k's type, together with the expression of the square forecast error














2   2xjk(tk   )(mkj   )

dtk




2 + xik(mki   )
2   2xikxjk(mki   )(mkj   ):
Next, application of the message strategy specied in (2) to agent k with respect to the




















2 + xik(mki   )
















jk(mki   )(   ):
Furthermore, application of the message strategy specied in (2) to agent k with respect



































(1   xik) + (1   xjk)x
2











































Then, by substituting equations (24)-(26) into equation (23), we can rewrite agent i's
expected payo in stage 1 as










































35For k 2 Ni(g), let ik : [0;1] ! R be the function dened as
ik(xik) :=
h



























Using this, taking into account the fact that, for each i 2 N, xik = 0 for k = 2 Ni(g) [ fig,
and by rearranging terms, we can express agent i's expected payo in stage 1 as




























It follows that the information acquisition strategy x
i and the corresponding induced
beliefs 
i satisfy conditions (SR2) and (SR1) in the denition of IAE, Denition 1, if and
only if, for each k 2 Ni(g), x
ik solves the problem:
maxxik2[0;1] ik(xik):
Given the parabolic shape of the function ik, we obtain that either (i) x
ik = 0 , ik(0) 









ik = 1 , ik(1)  ik(0) , c 
2
h






, or (iii) x
ik 2 f0;1g , ik(1) = ik(0)
, c = 2
h







The result follows since we considered a generic agent i 2 N. 2
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider a network g 2 G. Since the cost of information acquisi-
tion is given by function c : [0;1] ! R+, we can rewrite equation (20), which gives us the
welfare function evaluated in stage 1, as










Therefore, as shown in the proof of Proposition 1, for each agent i 2 N and each k 2 Ni(g),





Corner solutions for this problem are ruled out by the assumptions c0(0) = 0 and c0(1) >
22(1 + r) on the shape of the cost function. It follows that xik 2 (0;1), for each agent
36i 2 N and each neighbor k 2 Ni(g), must hold in each ecient information acquisition
prole. Furthermore, it follows from the assumption c00(x) > 22(1+r), for each x 2 [0;1],




2 for each i 2 N and each k 2 Ni(g)
characterizes the solution of the planner's problem for each agent i 2 N and each neighbor
k 2 Ni(g), as stated. 2
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider a network g 2 G and an agent i 2 N. Let x
i and 
i be,
respectively, an information acquisition strategy and the corresponding induced beliefs
that satisfy conditions (SR2) and (SR1) in the denition of IAE, Denition 1. As shown
in the proof of Proposition 2, for each k 2 Ni(g), x
ik must solve the problem:
maxxik2[0;1] ik(xik):
Now, since the cost of information acquisition function c : [0;1] ! R+, the denition of
function ik, for k 2 Ni(g) given in expression (27), becomes
ik(xik) :=
h


























From the assumptions c0(0) = 0 and c0(1) > 22(1+r), it follows that x
ik 2 (0;1) for each
k 2 Ni(g). Furthermore, from the assumption c00(x) > 22(1 + r) for each x 2 [0;1], one
obtains that the optimal information acquisition choice of agent i with respect to each of



















The result follows since we considered a generic agent i 2 N. 2
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